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Abstract
Membership inference determines, given a sam-
ple and trained parameters of a machine learn-
ing model, whether the sample was part of the
training set. In this paper, we derive the optimal
strategy for membership inference with a few as-
sumptions on the distribution of the parameters.
We show that optimal attacks only depend on the
loss function, and thus black-box attacks are as
good as white-box attacks. As the optimal strat-
egy is not tractable, we provide approximations of
it leading to several inference methods, and show
that existing membership inference methods are
coarser approximations of this optimal strategy.
Our membership attacks outperform the state of
the art in various settings, ranging from a simple
logistic regression to more complex architectures
and datasets, such as ResNet-101 and Imagenet.
1. Introduction
Ateniese et al. (2015) state that “it is unsafe to release
trained classifiers since valuable information about the
training set can be extracted from them”. The problem
that we address in this paper, i.e., to determine whether a
sample has been used to train a given model, is related to
the privacy implications of machine learning systems. They
were first discussed in the context of support vector ma-
chines (Rubinstein et al., 2009; Biggio et al., 2014). The
problem of “unintended memorization” (Carlini et al., 2018)
appears in most applications of machine learning, such as
natural language processing systems (Carlini et al., 2018)
or image classification (Yeom et al., 2018).
More specifically, we consider the problem of membership
inference, i.e., we aim at determining if a specific image was
used to train a model, given only the (image, label) pair and
the model parameters. This question is important to protect
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both the privacy and intellectual property associated with
data. For neural networks, the privacy issue was recently
considered by Yeom et al. (2018) for the MNIST and CI-
FAR datasets. The authors evidence the close relationship
between overfitting and privacy of training images. This is
reminiscent of prior membership inference attacks, which
employ the output of the classifier associated with a particu-
lar sample to determine whether it was used during training
or not (Shokri et al., 2017).
At this stage, it is worth defining the different levels of
information to which the “attacker”, i.e., the membership
inference system, has access to. We assume that the attacker
knows the data distribution and the specifications of the
model (training procedure, architecture of the network, etc),
even though they are not necessarily required for all meth-
ods. We refer to the white-box setting as the case where the
attacker knows all the network parameters. On a side note,
the setup commonly adopted in differential privacy (Dwork
et al., 2006) corresponds to the white-box setting, where the
attacker additionally knows all the training samples except
the one to be tested.
The black-box setting is when these parameters are unknown.
For classification models, the attacker has only access to the
output for a given input, in one of the following forms:
(i) the classifier decision;
(ii) the loss of the correct label;
(iii) the full response for all classes.
Prior works on membership inference commonly assume
(i) or (iii). Our paper focuses on the black-box case (ii),
in which we know the loss incurred by the correct label.
The state of the art in this setting are the shadow models
proposed by Shokri et al. (2017).
In our work, we use a probabilistic framework to derive
a formal analysis of the optimal attack. This framework
encompasses both Bayesian learning, and noisy training,
where the noise is injected (Welling & Teh, 2011) or comes
from the stochasticity of SGD. Under mild assumptions on
the distribution of the parameters, we derive the optimal
membership inference strategy. This strategy only depends
on the classifier through evaluation of the loss, thereby show-
ing that black-box attacks will perform as well as white-box
attacks in this optimal asymptotic setting. This result may
explain why, to the best of our knowledge, the literature
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does not report white-box attacks outperforming the state-
of-the-art black-box-(ii) attacks.
The aforementioned optimal strategy is not tractable,
therefore we introduce approximations to derive an
explicit method for membership inference. As a
byproduct of this derivation, we show that state-of-the-
art approaches (Shokri et al., 2017; Yeom et al., 2018) are
coarser approximations of the optimal strategy. One of
the approximation drastically simplifies the membership
inference procedure by simply relying on the loss and a cal-
ibration term. We employ this strategy to the more complex
case of neural networks, and show that it outperforms all
approaches we are aware of.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• We show, under a few assumptions on training, that the
optimal inference only depends on the loss function,
and not on the parameters of the classifier. In other
terms, white-box attacks don’t provide any additional
information and result in the same optimal strategy.
• We employ different approximations to derive three
explicit membership attack strategies. We show that
state-of-the-art methods constitute other approxima-
tions. Simple simulations show the superiority of our
approach on a simple regression problem.
• We apply a simplified, tractable, strategy to infer the
membership of images to the train set in the case of
the public image classification benchmarks CIFAR and
Imagenet. It outperforms the state of the art for mem-
bership inference, namely the shadow models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related
work. Section 3 introduces our probabilistic formulation
and derives our main theoretical result. This section also
discusses the connection between membership inference
and differential privacy. Section 4 considers approximations
for practical use-cases, which allow us to derive inference
strategies in closed-form, some of which are connected with
existing methods from the literature. Section 5 summarizes
the practical algorithms derived from our analysis. Finally,
Section 6 considers the more difficult case of membership
inference for real-life neural networks and datasets.
2. Related work
Leakage of information from the training set. Our
work is related to the topics of overfitting and memorization
capabilities of classifiers. Determining what neural net-
works actually memorize from their training set is not trivial.
A few recent works (Zhang et al., 2017; Yeom et al., 2018)
evaluate how a network can fit random labels. Zhang et al.
(2017) replace true labels by random labels and show that
popular neural nets can perfectly fit them in simple cases,
such as small datasets (CIFAR10) or Imagenet without data
augmentation. Krueger et al. (2017) extend their analysis
and argue in particular that the effective capacity of neural
nets depends on the dataset considered. In a privacy con-
text, Yeom et al. (2018) exploit this memorizing property
to watermark networks. As a side note, random labeling
and data augmentation have been used for the purpose of
training a network without any annotated data (Dosovitskiy
et al., 2014; Bojanowski & Joulin, 2017).
In the context of differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006),
recent works (Wang et al., 2016; Bassily et al., 2016) sug-
gest that guaranteeing privacy requires learning systems to
generalize well, i.e., to not overfit. Wang et al. (2015) show
that Bayesian posterior sampling offers differential privacy
guarantees. Abadi et al. (2016) introduce noisy SGD to
learn deep models with differential privacy.
Membership Inference. A few recent works (Hayes
et al., 2017; Shokri et al., 2017; Long et al., 2018) have ad-
dressed membership inference. Yeom et al. (2018) propose
a series of membership attacks and derive their performance.
Long et al. (2018) observe that some training images are
more vulnerable than others and propose a strategy to iden-
tify them. Hayes et al. (2017) analyze privacy issues arising
in generative models. Dwork et al. (2015) and Sankarara-
man et al. (2009) provide optimal strategies for membership
inference in genomics data.
Shadow models. Shadow models were introduced by
Shokri et al. (2017) in the context of black-box attacks.
In this setup, an attacker has black-box-(iii) access (full re-
sponse for all classes) to a model trained on a private dataset,
and to a public dataset that follows the same distribution as
the private dataset. The attacker wishes to perform member-
ship inference using black-box outputs of the private model.
For this, the attacker simulates models by training shadow
models on known splits from the public set. On this simu-
lated models, the attacker can analyze the output patterns
corresponding to samples from the training set and from a
held-out set. Shokri et al. (2017) propose to train an attack
model that learns to predict, given an output pattern, whether
it corresponds to a training or held-out sample. If the attack
model simply predicts “training” when the output activa-
tions fire on the correct class, this strategy is equivalent to
Yeom et al. (2018)’s adversary. Salem et al. (2019) further
show that shadow models work under weaker assumptions
than those of Shokri et al. (2017).
3. Membership inference model
In this section, we derive the Bayes optimal performance
for membership inference (Theorem 1). We then make
the connection with differential privacy and propose looser
guarantees that prevent membership inference.
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3.1. Posterior distribution of parameters
Let D be a data distribution, from which we sample n ∈ N
points z1, z2, . . . , zn ∼
i.i.d.
D. A machine learning algorithm
produces parameters θ that incur a low loss
∑n
i=1 `(θ, zi).
Typically in the case of classification, z = (x, y) where x is
an input sample and y a class label, and the loss function `
is high on samples (x, y′) for which y′ 6= y.
We assume that the machine learning algorithm has some
randomness, and we model it with a posterior distribution
over parameters θ|z1, . . . , zn. The randomness in θ either
comes from the training procedure (e.g., Bayesian posterior
sampling), or arises naturally, as is the case with Stochastic
Gradient methods.
In general, we assume that the posterior distribution follows:
P(θ | z1, . . . , zn) ∝ e− 1T
∑n
i=1 `(θ,zi), (1)
where T is a temperature parameter, intuitively controlling
the stochasticity of θ. T = 1 corresponds to the case of the
Bayesian posterior, T → 0 the case of MAP (Maximum A
Posteriori) inference and a small T to the case of averaged
SGD (Polyak & Juditsky, 1992). Note that we do not include
a prior on θ: we assume that the prior is either uniform on a
bounded θ, or that it has been factored in the loss term `.
3.2. Membership inference
Given θ produced by such a machine learning algorithm,
membership inference asks the following question: What
information does θ contain about its training set z1, . . . , zn?
Formally, we assume that binary membership variables
m1,m2, . . . ,mn are drawn independently, with probability
λ = P(mi = 1). The samples for which mi = 0 are the test
set, while the samples for which mi = 1 are the training set.
Equation (1) becomes
P(θ | z1, . . . , zn,m1, . . . ,mn) ∝ e− 1T
∑n
i=1mi`(θ,zi),
(2)
Taking the case of z1 without loss of generality, membership
inference determines, given parameters θ and sample z1,
whether m1 = 1 or m1 = 0.
Definition 1 (Membership inference). Inferring the mem-
bership of sample z1 to the training set amounts to comput-
ing:
M(θ, z1) := P(m1 = 1 | θ, z1). (3)
Notation. We denote by σ the sigmoid function σ(u) =
(1 + e−u)−1. We collect the knowledge about the
other samples and their memberships into the set T =
{z2, ..., zn,m2, ...,mn}.
3.3. Optimal membership inference
In Theorem 1, we derive the explicit formula forM(θ, z1).
Theorem 1. Given a parameter θ and a sample z1, the
optimal membership inference is given by:
M(θ, z1) = ET
[
σ
(
log
(
P(θ |m1 = 1, z1, T )
P(θ |m1 = 0, z1, T )
)
+ tλ
)]
,
(4)
with tλ = log
(
λ
1−λ
)
.
Proof. By the law of total expectation, we have:
M(θ, z1) = P(m1 = 1 | θ, z1) (5)
= ET [P (m1 = 1 | θ, z1, T )] . (6)
Applying Bayes’ formula:
P (m1 = 1 | θ, z1, T ) = P (θ |m1 = 1, z1, T )P(m1 = 1)P (θ | z1, T ) ,
(7)
=
α
α+ β
= σ
(
log
(
α
β
))
(8)
where:
α := P (θ |m1 = 1, z1, T )P(m1 = 1) (9)
β := P (θ |m1 = 0, z1, T )P(m1 = 0) (10)
Given that P(m1 = 1) = λ,
log
(
α
β
)
= log
(
P(θ |m1 = 1, z1, T )
P(θ |m1 = 0, z1, T )
)
+ log
(
λ
1− λ
)
,
(11)
which gives the expression forM(θ, z1).
Note that Theorem 1 only relies on the fact that θ given
{z1, ..., zn,m1, ...,mn} is a random variable, but it does
not make any assumption on the form of the distribution. In
particular the loss ` does not appear in the expression.
Theorem 2 uses the assumption in Equation (2) to further
explicit M(θ, z1); we give its formal expression below,
prove it, and analyze the expression qualitatively. Let us
first define the posterior over the parameters given samples
z2, . . . , zn and memberships m2, . . . ,mn:
pT (θ) :=
e−
1
T
∑n
i=2mi`(θ,zi)∫
t
e−
1
T
∑n
i=2mi`(t,zi)dt
. (12)
Theorem 2. Given a parameter θ and a sample z1, the
optimal membership inference is given by:
M(θ, z1) = ET [σ (s(z1, θ, pT ) + tλ)] (13)
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where we define the following score:
τp(z1) := −T log
(∫
t
e−
1
T `(t,z1)p(t)dt
)
(14)
s(z1, θ, p) :=
1
T
(τp(z1)− `(θ, z1)) . (15)
Proof. Singling out m1 in Equation (2) yields the following
expressions for α and β:
α = λ
e−
1
T `(θ,z1)e−
1
T
∑n
i=2mi`(θ,zi)∫
t
e−
1
T `(t,z1)e−
1
T
∑n
i=2mi`(t,zi)dt
(16)
= λ
e−
1
T `(θ,z1)pT (θ)∫
t
e−
1
T `(t,z1)pT (t)dt
, (17)
and
β = (1− λ) e
− 1T
∑n
i=2mi`(θ,zi)∫
t
e−
1
T
∑n
i=2mi`(t,zi)dt
= (1− λ)pT (θ).
(18)
Thus,
log
(
α
β
)
= −`(θ, z1)
T
− log
(∫
t
e−
1
T `(t,z1))pT (t)dt
)
+ tλ
= s(z1, θ, pT ) + tλ. (19)
Then, Equation (8) yields the expected result.
The first observation in Theorem 2 is thatM(θ, z1) does
not depend on the parameters θ beyond the evaluation of
the loss `(θ, ·): this strategy does not require, for instance,
internal parameters of the model that a white-box attack
could provide. This means that if we can compute τp or
approximate it well enough, then the optimal membership
inference depends only on the loss. In other terms, asymptot-
ically, the white-box setting does not provide any benefit
compared to black-box membership inference.
Let us analyze qualitatively the terms in the expression:
Since T is a training set, pT corresponds to a posterior over
this training set, i.e., a typical distribution of trained param-
eters. τp(z1) is the softmin of loss terms `(·, z1) over these
typical models, and corresponds therefore to the typical loss
of sample z1 under models that have not seen z1.
The quantity τp(z1) can be seen as a threshold, to which
the loss `(θ, z1) is compared. Around this threshold, when
`(θ, z1) ≈ τp(z1), then s ≈ 0: since σ(tλ) = λ, the mem-
bership posterior probability M(θ, z1) is equal to λ, and
thus we have no information onm1 beyond prior knowledge.
As the loss `(·, z1) gets lower than this threshold, s becomes
positive. Since σ is non decreasing, when s(z1, θ, pT ) > 0,
M(θ, z1) > λ and thus we gain non-trivial membership
information on z1.
Another consequence of Theorem 2 is that a higher temper-
ature T decreases s, and thus decreases P(m1 = 1 | θ, z1):
it corresponds to the intuition that more randomness in θ
protects the privacy of training data.
3.4. Differential privacy and guarantees
In this subsection we make the link with differential privacy.
Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) is a framework that
allows to learn model parameters θ while maintaining the
confidentiality of data. It ensures that even if a malicious
attacker knows parameters θ and samples zi, i ≥ 2, for
which mi = 1, the privacy of z1 is not compromised.
Definition 2 (-differential privacy). A machine learning
algorithm is -differentially private if, for any choice of z1
and T ,
log
(
P(θ |m1 = 1, z1, T )
P(θ |m1 = 0, z1, T )
)
< . (20)
Note that this definition is slightly different from the one of
Dwork et al. (2006) in that we consider the removal of z1
rather than its substitution with z′. Additionally we consider
probability densities instead of probabilities of sets, without
loss of generality.
Property 1 (-differential privacy). If the training is -
differentially private, then:
P(m1 = 1 | θ, z1) ≤ λ+ 
4
. (21)
Proof. Combining Equation (20) and the fact that σ(u) ≤
σ(v) + max(u− v, 0)/4 (Appendix A.3), we have:
σ
(
log
(
P(θ |m1 = 1, z1, T )
P(θ |m1 = 0, z1, T )
)
+ tλ
)
≤ σ(tλ) + 
4
= λ+

4
. (22)
Combining this expression with Theorem 1 yields the result.
Note that this bound gives a tangible sense of . In general,
decreasing  increases privacy, but there is no consensus
over “good” values of ; this bound indicates for instance
that  = 0.01 would be sufficient for membership privacy.
-differential privacy gives strong membership inference
guarantees, at the expense of a constrained training proce-
dure resulting generally in a loss of accuracy (Abadi et al.,
2016). However, if we assume that the attacker knows the
zi, i ≥ 2 for whichmi = 1, -differential privacy is required
to protect the privacy of z1. Depending on the information
we have on zi, i ≥ 2, there is a continuum between differen-
tial privacy (all zi’s are known) and membership inference
(only prior knowledge on zi). In the case of membership
inference, it suffices to have the following guarantee:
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Definition 3 ((, δ) membership privacy). The training is
(, δ)-membership private for some  > 0, δ > 0 if with
probability 1− δ over the choice of T :∫
t
`(t, z1)pT (t)dt− `(θ, z1) ≤ . (23)
Property 2. If the training is (, δ)-membership private,
then:
P(m1 = 1 | θ, z1) ≤ λ+ 
4T
+ δ. (24)
Proof. Jensen’s inequality states that for any distribution p
and any function f :∫
t
f(t)p(t)dt ≤ log
(∫
t
ef(t)p(t)dt
)
, (25)
hence the score s from Equation (15) verifies:
s(z1, θ, p) ≤ 1
T
(∫
t
`(t, z1)p(t)dt− `(θ, z1)
)
. (26)
Thus, distinguishing the cases δ and 1− δ in the expectation
in Equation (13),
P(m1 = 1 | θ, z1) ≤ δ + (1− δ)
(
λ+

4T
)
(27)
≤ λ+ 
4T
+ δ, (28)
which gives the desired bound.
Membership privacy provides a post-hoc guarantee on θ, z1.
Guarantees in the form of Equation (23) can be obtained by
PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) bounds.
4. Approximations for membership inference
Estimating the probability of Equation (15) mainly requires
to compute the term τp. Since its expression is intractable,
we use approximations to derive concrete membership at-
tacks (MA). We now detail these approximations, referred
to as MAST (MA Sample Threshold), MALT (MA Loss
Threshold) and MATT (MA Taylor Threshold).
4.1. MAST: Approximation of τ(z1)
We first make the mean-field assumption that pT (t) does
not depend on T (we note it p), and define
τ(z1) := log
(∫
t
e−
1
T `(t,z1)p(t)dt
)
. (29)
The quantity τ(·) is a “calibrating” term that reflects the
difficulty of a sample. Intuitively, a low τ(z1) means that
the sample z1 is easy to predict, and thus a low value of
`(θ, z1) does not necessarily indicate that z1 belongs to the
train set. Thus, Theorem 2 gives the optimal attack model:
sMAST(θ, z1) = −`(θ, z1) + τ(z1). (30)
4.2. MALT: Constant τ
If we further assume that τ(·) is constant, the optimal strat-
egy reduces to predicting that z1 comes from the training set
if its loss `(θ, z1) is lower than this threshold τ , and from
the test set otherwise:
sMALT(θ, z1) = −`(θ, z1) + τ. (31)
A similar strategy is proposed by Yeom et al. (2018) for
Gaussian models. Carlini et al. (2018) estimate a secret
token in text datasets by comparing probabilities of the sen-
tence “My SSN is X” with various values of X. Surprisingly,
to the best of our knowledge, it has not been proposed in
the literature to estimate the threshold τ on public data, and
to apply it for membership inference. As we show in Sec-
tion 6, this simple strategy yields better results than shadow
models. Their attack models take as input the softmax acti-
vation φθ(x) and the class label y, and predict whether the
sample comes from the training or test set. For classification
models, `(θ, (x, y)) = − log(φθ(x)y). Hence the optimal
attack performs:
sMALT(θ, (x, y)) = log(φθ(x)y) + τ. (32)
In Shokri et al. (2017), we argue that the attack model
essentially performs such an estimation, albeit in a non-
explicit way. In particular, we believe that the gap between
Shokri et al. (2017)’s method and ours is due to instabilities
in the estimation of τ and the numerical computation of the
log, as the model is given only φθ(x). As a side note, the
expectation term in T = z2, . . . , zn,m2, . . . ,mn is very
similar in spirit to the shadow models, and they can be
viewed as a Monte-Carlo estimation of this quantity.
An experiment with Gaussian data. We illustrate the
difference between a MALT (global τ ) and MAST (per-
sample τ(·)) on a simple toy example. Let’s assume we
estimate the mean µ of Gaussian data with unit variance.
We sample n values z1, . . . , zn from D = N (µ, I). The
estimate of the mean is θ = 1n′
∑n
i=1mizi where n
′ =
|{i |mi = 1}|. We have (see Appendix A.2 for derivations):
`(θ, zi) :=
1
2
‖zi − θ‖2 (33)
τ(zi) =
n′
2(n′ + 1)
‖zi − µ‖2 (34)
τ =
n′
2(n′ + 1)
E‖z − µ‖2 = n
′
2(n′ + 1)
d. (35)
The expression of τ(zi) shows that the “difficulty” of sample
zi is its distance to µ, i.e., how untypical this sample is.
Figure 1 shows the results with a global τ or a per-sample
τ : the per-sample τ better separates the two distributions,
leading to an increased membership inference accuracy.
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Figure 1. Comparison of MALT and MALT for membership inference on the mean estimator for Gaussian data (n = 100 samples in
2000 dimensions). Distribution of scores s used to distinguish between samples seen or not at training. MALT: a single threshold is used
for all the dataset; MAST: each sample gets assigned a different threshold. MAST better separates training and non-training samples.
MATT: Estimation with Taylor expansion We as-
sume that the posterior induced by the loss L(θ) =∑n
i=1mi`(θ, zi) is a Gaussian centered on θ
∗, the mini-
mum of the loss, with covariance C. This corresponds to
the Laplace approximation of the posterior distribution. The
inverse covariance matrix C−1 is asymptotically n times
the Fisher matrix (van der Vaart, 1998), which itself is the
Hessian of the loss (Kullback, 1997):
P(θ | z1, T ) = 1√
det (2piH−1)
e−
1
2 (θ−θ∗)TH(θ−θ∗).
(36)
We denote by θ∗0 (resp. θ
∗
1) the mode of the Gaussian corre-
sponding to {z2, ..., zn} (resp. {z1, ..., zn}), and H0 (resp.
H1) the corresponding Hessian matrix. We assume that H
is not impacted by removing z1 from the training set, and
thus H := H0 ≈ H1 (cf. appendix A.4 for a more precise
justification). The log-ratio is therefore
log
(
P(θ |m1 = 1, z1, T )
P(θ |m1 = 0, z1, T )
)
(37)
= −1
2
(θ − θ∗1)TH(θ − θ∗1) + 1
2
(θ − θ∗0)TH(θ − θ∗0)
= (θ − θ∗0)TH(θ∗1 − θ∗0)− 1
2
(θ∗1 − θ∗0)TH(θ∗1 − θ∗0).
The difference θ∗1 − θ∗0 can be estimated using a Taylor
expansion of the loss gradient around θ∗0 (see e.g. Koh &
Liang (2017)):
θ∗1 − θ∗0 ≈ −H−1∇θ`(θ∗0 , z1) (38)
Combining this with Equation (37) leads to
−(θ − θ∗0)T∇θ`(θ∗0 , z1)− 1
2
∇θ`(θ∗0 , z1)TH−1∇θ`(θ∗0 , z1).
(39)
We study the asymptotic behavior of this expression when
n→∞. On the left-hand side, the parameters θ and θ∗0 are
estimates of the optimal θ∗, and under mild conditions, the
error of the estimated parameters is of order 1/
√
n. There-
fore the difference θ − θ∗0 is of order 1/
√
n. On the right-
hand side, the matrix H is the summation of n sample-wise
Hessian matrices. Therefore, asymptotically, the right-hand
side shrinks at a rate 1/n, which is negligible compared
to the other, which shrinks at 1/
√
n. In addition to the
asymptotic reasoning, we verified this approximation exper-
imentally. Thus, we approximate Equation (39) to give the
following score:
sMATT(θ, z1) = −(θ − θ∗0)T∇θ`(θ∗0 , z1). (40)
Equation (40) has an intuitive interpretation: parameters θ
were trained using z1 if their difference with a set of parame-
ters trained without z1 (i.e. θ∗0) is aligned with the direction
of the update −∇θ`(θ∗0 , z1).
5. Membership inference algorithms
In this section, we detail how the approximations of
s(θ, z1, p) are employed to perform membership inference.
We assume that a machine learning model has been trained,
yielding parameters θ. We assume also that similar models
can be re-trained with different training sets. Given a sample
z1, we want to decide whether z1 belongs to the training set.
5.1. The 0-1 baseline
We consider as a baseline the “0-1” heuristic, which predicts
that z1 comes from the training set if the class is predicted
correctly, and from the test set if the class is predicted incor-
rectly. We note ptrain (resp. ptest) the classification accuracy
on the training (resp. held-out) set. The accuracy of the
heuristic is (see Appendix A.1 for derivations):
pbayes = λptrain + (1− λ)(1− ptest). (41)
For example when λ = 1/2, since ptrain ≥ ptest this heuristic
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is better than random guessing (accuracy 1/2) and the im-
provement is proportional to the overfitting gap ptrain − ptest.
5.2. Making hard decisions from scores
Variants of our method provide different estimates of
s(θ, z1, p). Theorem 2 shows that this score has to be passed
through a sigmoid function, but since it is an increasing func-
tion, the threshold can be chosen directly on these scores.
Estimation of this threshold has to be conducted on simu-
lated sets, for which membership information is known. We
observed that there is almost no difference between chosing
the threshold on the set to be tested and cross-validating
it. This is expected, as a one-dimensional parameter the
threshold is not prone to overfitting.
5.3. Membership algorithms
MALT: Threshold on the loss. Since τ in Equation (31) is
constant, and using the invariance to increasing functions,
we need only to use loss value for the sample, `(θ, z1).
MAST: Estimating τ(z1). To estimate τ(z1) in Equa-
tion (29), we train several models with different subsamples
of the training set. This yields a set of per-sample losses for
z1 that are averaged into an estimate of τ(z1).
MATT: the Taylor approximation. We run the training
on a separate set to obtain θ∗0 . Then we take a gradient step
over the loss to estimate the approximation in Equation (40).
Note that this strategy is not compatible with neural net-
works because the assumption that parameters lie around
a unique global minimum does not hold. In addition, pa-
rameters from two different networks θ and θ∗0 cannot be
compared directly as neural networks that express the same
function can have very different parameters (e.g. because
channels can be permuted arbitrarily).
6. Experiments
In this section we evaluate the membership inference meth-
ods on machine-learning tasks of increasing complexity.
6.1. Evaluation
We evaluate three metrics: the accuracy of the attack, and
the mean average precision when detecting either from train
(mAPtrain) or test (mAPtest) images. For the mean average
precision, the scores need not to be thresholded, the metric
is invariant to mapping by any increasing function.
6.2. Logistic regression
CIFAR-10 is a dataset of 32× 32 pixel images grouped in
10 classes. In this subsection, we consider two of the classes
(truck and boat) and vary the number of training images
Table 1. Accuracy (top) and mAP (bottom) of membership infer-
ence on the 2-class logistic regression with simple CNN features,
for different types of attacks. Note that 0-1 corresponds to the
baseline (Yeom et al., 2018). We do not report Shokri et al. (2017)
since Table 2 shows MALT performs better. Results are averaged
over 100 different random seeds.
Model accuracy Attack accuracy
n train validation 0− 1 MALT MATT
400 97.9 93.8 52.1 54.4 57.0
1000 97.3 94.5 51.4 52.6 54.5
2000 96.8 95.2 50.8 51.7 53.0
4000 97.7 95.6 51.0 51.4 52.1
6000 97.5 96.0 50.7 51.0 51.8
mAPtest mAPtrain
n MALT MATT MALT MATT
400 55.8 60.1 51.9 57.1
1000 53.2 56.6 50.5 54.8
2000 51.8 54.4 50.4 53.4
4000 51.9 53.7 50.1 52.6
6000 51.4 53.0 50.2 52.2
from n = 400 to 6, 000.
We train a logistic regression to separate the two classes.
The logistic regression takes as input features extracted from
a pretrained Resnet18 on CIFAR-100 (a disjoint dataset).
The regularization parameter C of the logistic regression is
cross-validated on held-out data.
We assume that λ = 1/2 (n/2 training images and n/2 test
images). We also reserve n/2 images to estimate θ∗0 for the
MATT method. In both experiments, we report the peak
accuracy obtained for the best threshold (cf. Section 5.2).
Table 1 shows the results of our experiments, in terms of
accuracy and mean average precision. In accuracy, the
Taylor expansion method MATT outperforms the MALT
method, for any number of training instances n, which itself
obtains much better results than the naive 0-1 attack.
Interestingly, it shows a difference between MALT and
MATT: both perform similarly in terms of mAPtest, but
MATT slightly outperforms MALT in mAPtrain. The main
reason for this difference is that the MALT attack is asym-
metric: it is relatively easy to predict that elements come
from the test set, as they have a high loss, but elements with
a low loss can come either from the train set or the test set.
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Table 2. Accuracy of membership attacks on the CIFAR-10 classi-
fication with a simple neural network. The numbers for the related
works are from the respective papers.
Method Accuracy
0-1 (Yeom et al., 2018) 69.4
Shadow models (Shokri et al., 2017) 73.9
MALT 77.1
MAST 77.6
6.3. Small convolutional network
In this section we train a small convolutional network1 with
the same architecture as Shokri et al. (2017) on the CIFAR-
10 dataset, using a training set of 15, 000 images. Our model
is trained for 50 epochs with a learning rate of 0.001. We
assume a balanced prior on membership (λ = 1/2).
We run the MALT and MAST attacks on the classifiers.
As stated before, the MATT attack cannot be carried out
on convolutional networks. For MAST, the threshold is
estimated from 30 shadow models: we train these 30 shadow
models on 15, 000 images chosen among the train+held-out
set (30, 000 images). Thus, for each image, we have on
average 15 models trained on it and 15 models not trained
on it: we estimate the threshold for this image by taking the
value τ(z) that separates the best the two distributions: this
corresponds to a non-parametric estimation of τ(z).
Table 2 shows that our estimations outperform the related
works. Note that this setup gives a slight advantage to
MAST as the threshold is estimated directly for each sample
under investigation, whereas MALT first estimates a thresh-
old, and then applies it to never-seen data. Yet, in contrast
with the experiment on Gaussian data, MAST performs only
slightly better than MALT. Our interpretation for this is that
the images in the training set have a high variability, so it
is difficult to obtain a good estimate of τ(z1). Furthermore,
our analysis of the estimated thresholds τ(z1) show that
they are very concentrated around a central value τ , so their
impact when added to the scores is limited.
Therefore, in the following experiment we focus on the
MALT attack.
6.4. Evaluation on Imagenet
We evaluate a real-world dataset and tackle classification
with large neural networks on the Imagenet dataset (Deng
et al., 2009; Russakovsky et al., 2015), which contains 1.2
million images partitioned into 1000 categories. We divide
Imagenet equally into two splits, use one for training and
hold out the rest of the data.
1 2 convolutional and 2 linear layers with Tanh non-linearity.
Table 3. Imagenet classification with deep convolutional networks:
Accuracy of membership inference attacks of the models.
Model Augmentation 0-1 MALT
Resnet101 None 76.3 90.4
Flip, Crop ±5 69.5 77.4
Flip, Crop 65.4 68.0
VGG16 None 77.4 90.8
Flip, Crop ±5 71.3 79.5
Flip, Crop 63.8 64.3
We experiment with the popular VGG-16 (Simonyan &
Zisserman, 2014) and Resnet-101 (He et al., 2016) archi-
tectures. The model is learned in 90 epochs, with an initial
learning rate of 0.01, divided by 10 every 30 epochs. Param-
eter optimization is conducted with SGD with a momentum
of 0.9, a weight decay of 10−4, and a batch size of 256.
We conduct the membership inference test by running the
0-1 attack and MALT. An important factor for the success of
the attacks is the amount of data augmentation. To assess the
effect of data augmentation, we train different networks with
varying data augmentation: None, Flip+Crop±5, Flip+Crop
(by increasing intensity).
Table 3 shows that data augmentation reduces the gap be-
tween the training and the held-out accuracy. This decreases
the accuracy of the Bayes attack and the MALT attack. As
we can see, without data augmentation, it is possible to
guess with high accuracy if a given image was used to train
a model (about 90% with our approach, against 77% for
existing approaches). Stronger data augmentation reduces
the accuracy of the attacks, that still remain above 64%.
7. Conclusion
This paper has addressed the problem of membership infer-
ence by adopting a probabilistic point of view. This led us
to derive the optimal inference strategy. This strategy, while
not explicit and therefore not applicable in practice, does
not depend on the parameters of the classifier if we have ac-
cess to the loss. Therefore, a main conclusion of this paper
is to show that, asymptotically, white-box inference does
not provide more information than an optimized black-box
setting.
We then proposed two approximations that lead to three
concrete strategies. They outperform competitive strategies
for a simple logistic problem, by a large margin for our
most sophisticated approach (MATT). Our simplest strat-
egy (MALT) is applied to the more complex problem of
membership inference from a deep convolutional network
on Imagenet, and significantly outperforms the baseline.
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A. Derivations
A.1. Accuracy of the 0-1 attack
We note g1 the binary random variable that indicates whether
z1 was classified correctly, and thus considered part of the
training set by the 0-1 attack. The attack is accurate if
g1 = 1 on training images and g1 = 0 on other images.
This happens with probability
pbayes = P(m1 = g1)
= P(g1=1 |m1=1)P(m1=1) + P(g1=0 |m1=0)P(m1=0)
= λptrain + (1− λ)(1− ptest). (42)
A.2. Gaussian data
Estimation of average distribution. We assume without
loss of generality that µ = 0. θ is the mean of n Gaussian
variables, centered on µ with covariance I . Thus, θ follows
a Gaussian distribution, of variance 1nI .∫
t
e−`(z,t)p(t)dt =
1√
det
(
2pi
n I
) ∫
t
e
−‖z−t‖2−n‖t‖2
2 dt
(43)
Denoting ω := zn+1 , we have
n‖t‖2 + ‖z − t‖2 = (n+ 1)‖t− ω‖2 + n
n+ 1
‖z‖2,
(44)
hence∫
t
e
−‖z−t‖2−n‖t‖2
2 dt =
√
det
(
2pi
n+ 1
I
)
e−
n‖z‖2
2(n+1) . (45)
We have:
log
(∫
t
e−`(z,t)p(t)dt
)
= C − n
2(n+ 1)
‖z‖2 (46)
A.3. Bound on variations of a sigmoid
We show that
σ(u) ≤ σ(v) + |u− v|+/4 ∀u, v ∈ R. (47)
Since σ is increasing, the relation is obvious for v > u.
For u > v, we observe that
sup
u
|σ′(u)| = sup
u
e−u
(1 + e−u)2
=
1
4
. (48)
Thus, σ is Lipschitz-continuous with constant 1/4, which
entails Equation (47).
A.4. Hessian approximations
We give here a rough justification of the approximation
conducted in the MATT paragraph of Section 5.
Equation (37) writes:
log
(
P(θ |m1 = 1, z1, T )
P(θ |m1 = 0, z1, T )
)
(49)
≈ −(θ − θ∗1)TH(θ − θ∗1) + (θ − θ∗0)TH(θ − θ∗0).
(50)
This approximation holds up to the following quantity:
δ = −1
2
log
(
det (H1)
det (H0)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ1
+(θ∗1 − θ∗0)T (H1 −H0)(θ∗1 − θ∗0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ2
.
(51)
We reason qualitatively in orders of magnitude. θ∗0 − θ∗1
has order of magnitude 1/n, and H1 − H0 has order of
magnitude 1, so δ2 has order of magnitude 1/n2. As for
δ1, we observe that H−10 (H1−H0) has order of magnitude
1/n and therefore
δ1 = −1
2
log
(
det (H1)
det (H0)
)
(52)
= −1
2
log
(
det
(
I +H−10 (H1 −H0)
))
(53)
≈ −Tr(H−10 (H1 −H0)). (54)
Hence, δ1 has order of magnitude 1/n as well. Since the
main term in Equation (37) is in the order of 1/
√
n, δ1 and
δ2 can be safely neglected.
